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T
his issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases includes a
group of invited articles addressing pandemic influen-
za. Over the past 2 years, concerns about a new influenza
pandemic caused by either an epizootic avian strain, such
as H5N1, or by some other influenza virus have engaged
top virologists, epidemiologists, and policymakers as well
as the press and public (1,2). However, many scientific
questions about the risk of a pandemic remain unanswered,
and as science attempts to catch up on decades of relative
neglect, fear and speculation have begun to mount. Such
speculation has led to what the press has called “hysteria”
in private stockpiling of antiviral drugs; this panic has even
been compared to the widespread fear of an atomic bomb
attack that gripped the United States in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, when many citizens built and stocked under-
ground fallout shelters.
In this climate, scientific and public health communi-
ties must continually update and review what is known
about the risk of pandemic influenza and about options to
prevent and control it. This group of articles is intended to
serve as a modest database of current knowledge and
informed opinion in several key areas, including the histo-
ry of pandemic influenza and public health responses to it;
influenza pathogenesis, natural history, and host immune
responses to infection; and influenza prevention and treat-
ment with drugs and vaccines.  
Missing from the list of authors in this issue is a man
whose insight, effort, and support probably did more to
advance our understanding of influenza than the efforts of
any other single individual over the past 30 years, John R.
LaMontagne, whose untimely death in 2004 was a great
loss to the scientific community (for additional informa-
tion, see http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/about/overview/previ-
ous directors/LaMontagne/). 
John would have agreed with another visionary scien-
tist, Hermann Pidoux (1808–1882), who observed that
“epidemics are the lives of diseases.” In an attempt to
understand a disease as explosive and fatal as pandemic
influenza, the classic emerging/reemerging infectious dis-
ease, its history has been self-consciously chronicled for
several centuries. The importance of that effort was recog-
nized during the pandemic of 1889 and strongly reinforced
by the next pandemic in 1918–1919 (the so-called
“Spanish flu,” the deadliest pandemic in human history).
We review the life cycle of pandemic influenza during the
past century, including the pandemics of 1918, 1957, 1968,
and 1977, as well as a feared nonpandemic in 1976, look-
ing at pandemics from different angles, questioning
whether they are predictable and, if they are, what telltale
signs we should be looking for. 
The answers to these questions may not be reassuring.
The origin of the earliest human influenza virus yet identi-
fied, the 1918 pandemic virus, is still a mystery even after
genetic sequencing and comparison with other historical
and circulating influenza viruses (3,4). Though clearly
descended from an avian virus, the 1918 strain is geneti-
cally unlike any other influenza virus examined over the
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before the pandemic is an unknown source. Complicating
problems of origin, all of the pandemic and epidemic
influenza A viruses that have appeared since 1918 have
been descendants of it, arising by either genetic drift, reas-
sortment with prevalent avian viruses, or in 1 case (1977)
by apparent release from a freezer. Thus, little scientific
basis exists for predicting whether the current
enzootic/epizootic avian H5N1 virus will become pandem-
ic: none of the known pandemic influenza events of the
past 87 years seem to have much in common with the cur-
rent H5N1 situation.
Another problem is learning about the mechanisms by
which influenza A viruses, all of which are believed to be
endemic in wild waterfowl, their natural hosts, acquire the
capacities to switch hosts, produce diseases in these new
hosts, and in some cases, establish the ability to propagate
directly between them. While preliminary information
about the first 2 of these capacities is gradually becoming
known (5–7), little has been learned about the third. Thus,
predicting whether current H5N1 viruses are moving in the
direction of solving the ultimate challenge of host-switch-
ing/propagation in humans, or whether they are fundamen-
tally incapable of doing so, is difficult.
Although science may yet offer little in the way of pan-
demic prediction, understanding the size of the influenza
problem and the mechanisms by which influenza viruses
cause severe and fatal disease, i.e., pathogenesis, is still
important. Such knowledge is fundamental if we expect to
prevent and control epidemics using public health meas-
ures and clinical therapies. Again, answers are elusive.
Although influenza is a leading cause of death worldwide,
measuring the total effect of deaths from influenza is
impossible, in part because diagnostic records for a key
risk group, the elderly, are incomplete and imprecise (8).
Influenza also kills by different mechanisms such as pri-
mary viral pneumonia, secondary bacterial pneumonia in
virus-damaged lungs, and an acute respiratory distresslike
syndrome possibly associated with overly brisk immune
responses, as well as by cardiac and other pathways, and
by exacerbating serious chronic diseases such as diabetes
mellitus, renal diseases, and congestive heart failure. The
problems of understanding influenza occurrence and
pathogenesis are therefore complicated by the many differ-
ent pathways that lead to severe disease and death and by
the difficulty in determining the frequency with which
these events occur.
Because of these uncertainties and knowledge gaps,
establishing effective programs for public health control
and personal protection is particularly important. Vaccines
and drugs against circulating influenza viruses have been
used for decades, but their efficacy in any future pandem-
ic is difficult to predict because, with current knowledge,
the causative agent of a future pandemic cannot be known
in advance and may well be a novel virus whose suscepti-
bility to existing drugs and vaccines has not been estab-
lished. Important new technologies allow construction and
pretesting of vaccines against all of the known influenza
surface glycoproteins (16 hemagglutinins and 9 neu-
raminidases), although the likelihood that a new pandemic
strain would be preventable by such vaccines cannot be
known without an ability to predict its antigenic nature.
Among additional strategies to overcome this limitation is
development of “universal” vaccines based on antigens
shared by many, and ideally all, influenza viruses.
The recent H5N1 epizootics in Southeast Asia serve as
an important reminder of how few of the key determinants
of pandemic influenza are really understood. If there is a
single lesson to be learned from the articles in this issue, it
is that, as expressed by contributor Anthony Fauci, more
research is needed in many areas. We do not know whether
pandemic influenza will outpace the increasingly vigorous
research to contain it. But the race is on, the stakes are
high, and the world is nervously watching.
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